‏إظهار الرسائل ذات التسميات featured. إظهار كافة الرسائل
‏إظهار الرسائل ذات التسميات featured. إظهار كافة الرسائل

الأحد، 6 مايو 2012

Ezz Steel 2011 net profit falls 20%






Egypt's largest steel producer, Ezz Steel, said on Tuesday its 2011 net profit declined 20 percent from a year earlier.
Net profit after minority interests dropped to LE202 million (US$33.5 million) from LE252 million. Net sales rose 12 percent to LE18.6 billion.
The company was rocked by the uprising against leader Hosni Mubarak in February 2011 and its aftermath.
Egypt's attorney general jailed the company's chairman Ahmed Ezz in February of last year on corruption charges. He has since stepped down.

Gulf pledges of financial help late, shrouded in secrecy





Over a year ago, Gulf leaders pledged loan, grant and investment packages to rescue Egypt from financial disaster during its post-Mubarak transition. The offers were accompanied by generous expressions of brotherly support. But after months of waiting, it remains unclear how much money has actually arrived, in what amounts, and if the complete value of the Gulf promises will ever be delivered.
"These things are intrinsically opaque," said David Roberts, deputy director of the Royal United Services Institute for Defense and Security Studies in Qatar. "These are often just very large gestures; it’s really just a question of them following up on them."
But a failure on the part of Gulf countries to keep their word means Egypt is looking to the IMF and elsewhere for help with its liquidity crisis, and Egyptian officials have grown impatient.
Samir Radwan, Egypt’s first post-Mubarak finance minister, originally allayed fears of an economic catastrophe with the prospect of large amounts of money coming from the country’s Gulf neighbors.
In the months following 25 January 2011, generous aid offers from the oil-rich countries rolled in: US$3 billion from the United Arab Emirates, $10 billion, mostly in investments, from Qatar, and $4 billion from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
Now, government officials who had made budget calculations based on the packages are in an increasingly tight spot.
Last year, Radwan said the injections would be a mix of investments, grants, and loans that could help the country’s economic rebound. But the massive loans and grants, supposedly with no strings attached, also raised suspicions of what interests the Gulf countries had in Egypt’s interim political process.
Radwan’s tenure was over by July, after another wave of protests swept the country. The country’s fiscal policy and budget fell into different hands.
Hazem al-Beblawy, Radwan’s successor, employed a similar approach, soliciting funds from Gulf leaders and royalty.
But after Gulf money failed to appear, Beblawy warned that the country was on the cusp of a “financial crisis,” and entered talks with International Monetary Fund officials to seriously discuss securing a loan from the fund.
The failure of Gulf countries to follow through with their pledges was a significant obstacle he faced during his time in office, Beblawy wrote in his recently published, memoirs, “Four months inside the government’s cage.”
In his book, Beblawy tells of his efforts to solve Egypt’s serious liquidity problem, when he approached Gulf leaders to tell them how badly the government needed their funds. From various conversations, Beblawy understood from Arab leaders that most had to decided to “wait and see” about political and economic stability in the country before transferring any money.
“I told them that this approach is dangerous and detrimental,” he wrote. “Egypt is a central country in the region, and it is not wise to wait and leave her without aid. Such behavior might lead to the deterioration economic and political conditions in Egypt, which then might bring about negative effects on the Arab region in its entirety.”
But in recent months, the countries have come under renewed pressure to deliver.
In his first parliamentary address in February, one of Prime Minister Kamal al-Ganzouri’s first moves was to point his finger at the Arab states for their broken promises.
His accusations returned the Gulf funds issue to the political forefront. Since Ganzouri’s speech, Gulf leaders have expressed renewed intentions to deliver.
But information about the loans and packages is impossible to come by outside official statements to chosen media outlets.
Repeated visits to the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Cairo and requests for interviews for the purpose of this story were ignored, and requests to the UAE and Qatar embassies did not receive a response.
Saudi Arabia remains committed to providing $3.75 million in aid to Egypt, the country’s ambassador to Egypt said in February, denying rumors that the aid was conditioned on a not guilty verdict for the former president.
“The kingdom does not bind its aid to not prosecuting Mubarak, and it is illogical that Saudi Arabia would link Egypt's destiny to the trial,” Ahmed Abdel Aziz Qattan, the ambassador, said on a talk show in March, refuting rumors that the Kingdom wanted to protect the deposed president.
“Half a billion dollars were transferred through the Egyptian Foreign Ministry bank account at the Central Bank of Egypt as a grant to support the budget on 16 May 2011," said Qattan.
Qatar has not invested the promised $10 billion in Egypt due to the country’s instability, said Qatari Foreign Minister Khaled bin Mohamed al-Attiya in late January.
He said that Qatar will follow through on its promises once power is handed over to a civilian government.
The United States has also said that Egypt’s Gulf friends should deliver the money to bolster the expected IMF loan.
“We call on Egypt’s friends in the region and around the world to be prepared to use bilateral assistance to reinforce an IMF program with Egypt,” US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said in March.
There does seem to be a relationship between the arrival of the Gulf funds and the much-debated and disputed IMF loan. Approval from the fund is largely considered a vote of confidence in the competence and solubility of a government. Gulf leaders would likely see the IMF loan as a stamp of approval.
What has emerged is a chicken-and-egg dilemma for Gulf leaders who do not want to invest in a declining economy. Without the IMF loan, Gulf money won't come. Without Gulf money supporting its loan, the IMF is less likely to approve it.
In addition, analysts say the “wait and see” approach completely defies the purpose of the promised aid, and are baffled as to why the money hasn’t come. Waiting until economic conditions improve, they say, shows that the countries have only money-making interests.
“I’m really surprised at Qatar,” said Wael Gamal, managing editor of Al-Shorouk newspaper and economic commentator, during a January press conference on dropping Egypt’s debts. “They promised hundreds of millions in investment and none of it has come.”
It does not make sense to promise investments to help the country, Gamal said, if that same investment is only going to arrive if things improve.
The entire issue is based on rhetoric and official statements with no hard evidence, according to Amr Adly, director of the Economic and Social Justice Unit at the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, at the same press conference.
Adly contends that the Egyptian government has failed to release reliable statistics in the interim period about foreign reserves, the country’s budget, and the Gulf funds.
“How can we even know how much money has been received?” he said.  “How can we even know how much money has been given without real transparency?”
But Roberts said that Gulf countries can afford to make grandiose promises, because they operate entirely behind closed doors. That policy is unlikely to change.
"Here, or there, we don’t have anything approaching a transparent culture," he said, adding that it's unlikely to change because this is how they have historically managed their affairs. "And they've been successful," he said.

Leadership of 'Military Inc.' is running Egypt




The Egyptian military’s economic interests have long been considered too taboo to discuss in the mainstream media, so little is known about the sections of the economy that fall under the military’s control. But now that a military council is formally ruling the country, the time is ripe to examine the issue more closely.
Robert Springborg has written extensively on the Egyptian military and the politics and political economy of the Middle East. He is the author of two books on Egypt: "Mubarak’s Egypt: Fragmentation of the Political Order" (1989) and "Family Power and Politics in Egypt" (1982). His most recent work is a chapter on gas and Egyptian development in "The Handbook of Oil Politics," due for publication in 2012. From 2000 to 2002, he was director of the American Research Center in Egypt, and has held numerous other positions in the US, UK and Australia leading programs on the Middle East.
Al-Masry Al-Youm recently spoke on the phone with Springborg, who is currently in the US, about the importance of the military’s business interests in its decision-making process, what is meant by the military economy and the military’s relationship with Egypt’s privatization program.
Al-Masry Al-Youm: In early February, before Hosni Mubarak stepped down, you warned that the military would look to hold on to power. This is what we seem to be witnessing now with a longer-than-planned transitional phase.
Robert Springborg: I don’t believe I said the military would seek to hold onto power in the form of a classical coup d’etat. What I meant to say in any case was that the military would seek to ensure that it was not subordinated to any other power. The delay in constituting a new system of government results probably not from a change in the military’s strategic objective of “ruling but not governing,” but from the tactical difficulties of forming a civilian government that forswears any meaningful control over the military.
Al-Masry: How much do you think the military’s vast business interests in the country influence their desire to stay in power?
Springborg: The business interests of the military are hugely important to their decision-making, and the leadership of "military incorporated," which is same as the leadership of the military itself, is now running the country.
A key problem is that the military economy lacks transparency. It is opaque, so we don’t know its exact size or components. Another issue is that the military’s business interests distract them from their national security roles, of which the key but not only one is to defend the country. The Egyptian military lags behind others in the region in part because it is so preoccupied with generating revenues. Its abilities to carry out search and rescue, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, anti-piracy, and to operate with other, friendly forces are weak. They have modern equipment, but much of it is not operable because they aren’t training personnel adequately to use nor to maintain it. One reason why they are not is that they employ conscripts in military-controlled businesses. 
Al-Masry: How do you define the military economy?
Springborg: The military economy includes the numerous factories and production facilities that fall under the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Military Production. These also include companies affiliated with the Arab Organization for Industrialization and National Services Production Organization. In theory, these are state-owned entities but their accounts are not subject to financial oversight by the Central Auditing Organization.
Al-Masry: A trend in the economy during the transitional phase is the re-nationalization of companies privatized under the Mubarak regime. How much is this in the military economy’s interests?
Springborg: The military opposed privatization that intensified in 2004 under the government of former Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif, and that was overseen by former Investment Minister Mahmoud Mohie Eddin. It was upset at the increased pace of privatization. That said, the military was happy with privatization as long as it ended up [gaining from it]. It didn’t want the government to sell state-owned enterprises to Gamal Mubarak’s cronies. So under the Nazif government, some of the privatization in state-owned enterprises went to the military to mollify its leadership. Its interests in strategic areas, such as port facilities, ship repair and building, increased. The Alexandria Shipyard, for example, is owned by the military, and under Nazif they acquired a competitor company. There was also an unwritten rule under Mubarak that mid-ranking officers and generals would get senior positions within privatized companies. Aviation companies and construction companies do have senior generals working in them.
Al-Masry: How important are their business holdings given that strategic industries, such as cement, are not within their control?
Springborg: Well, they are unhappy about that state of affairs. The military is not strongly represented in energy-intensive industries. The compensation to that is that they do control a lot of land. The total asset value of their land holdings is not clear, but we know that much of the land allocated to the construction and tourism sectors was or remains under military control. Starting from the 1980s, under Mubarak, the military got the land and crony capitalists got the energy intensive production industries.
The military’s biggest interest is in the construction industry. This is because the military has its own, internal construction capacities; because of its influence over the allocation of land; and because construction depends heavily on relations with government, either because it is paying for it or because it must authorize it. Military officers have the governmental connections that facilitate contracts and approvals.
Al-Masry: From the perspective of protecting the military economy, is the military threatened by the upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections?
Springborg: Yes. What it wants is a weak parliament and a presidency that will not challenge its authority. As it now looks the parliament will be weak because it will be divided among various political forces and because it will not be based on any definitive constitutional authority. So it will not be strong enough to oversee the military, such as by examining its finances. So, any civilian control of the military by default will fall to the president.
That is why the apparent thinking now of the military is for the president to be someone from the military. The delay of the presidential election is due in part probably to the attempt to prepare the ground for a candidate either from the military or absolutely subordinate to it. In the meantime the military will look to expand its role in the economy, either through acquiring more companies or by assisting officer-owned companies gain more business. 

Amr Moussa slams protesters for attempting to break into Defense Ministry






Presidential hopeful Amr Moussa criticized attempts by some protesters to cross the barbed wire in front of the Defense Ministry to reach the ministry’s building during the clashes that broke out on Friday in Abbasseya.
State-run MENA news service quoted Moussa as saying during his visit to the industrial zone in Qoweisna, Monufiya, “I do not understand how some are attempting to break into the ministry. Where’s the state and what is the point of this invasion? What do those people want? Why enter the ministry? And in whose name? Everyone is starting to think that there is complete chaos in Egypt.”
Moussa, a frontrunner in the upcoming election, said protesters should stay away from a national institution like the Defense Ministry.
He added that he does not understand the point of such an “invasion” as the army has promised to hand over power on 30 June.
He said that as an Egyptian he does not accept this kind of behavior, accusing some of inciting the protesters to attack the ministry.
He said some are looking to serve their personal interests at the expense of the country.
“How could an Egyptian want to occupy the Defense Ministry?” he wondered, adding that those “rioting” close to the ministry were not revolutionaries.
Asked about calls to remove the government, Moussa said that those calling for the dismissal of the government are just trying to gain attention, particularly since the government will only remain in power for another four weeks.
Moussa led an opinion poll conducted last month by Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies with 41.1 percent support among respondents, followed by moderate former Muslim Brotherhood member Abdel Moneim Abouel Fotouh with 27.3 percent.

Abdel-Moneim Abul-Fotouh


Abdel-Moneim Abul-Fotouh



Abdel-Moneim Abul-Fotouh started off a few months ago with an approval rating in several polls of no more than four per cent. Today, he has some 27 per cent.

Presidential candidate Abdel-Moneim Abul-Fotouh is a medical doctor who graduated with honours, but who was denied an academic post owing to his political views. He was also a leading figure in the Muslim Brotherhood, the oldest Islamist organisation in the Arab world, until he was expelled from the group over his decision to run for president.

Abul-Fotouh is the presidential candidate of Islamist background who appeals most to intellectuals and ordinary people from all walks of life and all political backgrounds. According to the Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies this week, Abul-Fotouh was the second-most popular of all 13 presidential candidates, his approval ratings being consistently in the high 20s in opinion polls.
Now aged 60, Abul-Fotouh made his career in hospital administration, a profession that went hand-in-hand with what is closest to the heart of this white-haired and serious-looking man: humanitarian work and political activism.

Abul-Fotouh was born into a middle-class Cairo family on 15 October 1951. While still a university student, he developed a taste for what was then an increasingly influential political Islamic trend, and he joined the Al-Gamaa Al-Islamiya, an Islamist group that did not necessarily eschew violence in promoting its views.
From the Al-Gamaa Al-Islamiya Abul-Fotouh later moved to the Muslim Brotherhood, where he stayed for many years helping to improve the group's organisation through its Guidance Bureau, which is responsible for the Brotherhood's policy orientation. At the same time as he was working to strengthen the Brotherhood, Abul-Fotouh was engaging in humanitarian-relief work across the Muslim world. He also worked in Egypt's unions, perhaps a natural development for a man who had been very much involved in student unions during their heyday in Egyptian universities in the 1970s.

As secretary-general of the Arab Doctors Union and head of several Muslim relief agencies, Abul-Fotouh pursued such humanitarian and union work. As a prominent Islamist, he also made a name for himself as a leading opponent of the ruling regime, being associated with criticisms of the late president Anwar El-Sadat when Abul-Fotouh was still a student.

Despite several years spent in prison under the rule of ousted president Hosni Mubarak, Abul-Fotouh remained determined to oppose the regime. From the first day of last year's 25 January Revolution, Abul-Fotouh, unlike other leading figures of the Muslim Brotherhood and most of the current presidential candidates, joined the crowds calling for an end to the Mubarak regime.
Now himself a candidate in the presidential elections, Abul-Fotouh has managed to position himself as the favourite choice of many intellectuals, including those from liberal circles, as well as of many members of the traditional middle class and the youth of the Muslim Brotherhood itself, all without compromising his Islamist views. Such popularity has caused almost unprecedented tensions within the otherwise tightly controlled Brotherhood.
Abul-Fotouh has chosen a horse as his electoral symbol, a choice which, his supporters say, is an indication of their candidate's ability to "gallop ahead" in the presidential race. A PLATFORM -- 'STRONG EGYPT': In his electoral platform, Abul-Fotouh has consistently argued for policies that, he says, will make Egypt into a strong country. "I pledge to make Egypt one of the 20 strongest economies in the world within 10 years," he says, one of the key statements made by Abul-Fotouh at a meeting in Al-Azhar Park in Cairo to the delight of his supporters.

Abul-Fotouh's proposals include a set of large-scale projects that should help give a push to the economy, industry and agriculture. However, boosting the economy is only one element of the comprehensive plans Abul-Fotouh has put forward.

Other elements in his programme include putting an end to the unmistakable decline in Egypt's security, education and health services. If elected president, he has promised to upgrade budget allocations for education to 25 per cent and health to 15 per cent, compared to their less than seven per cent and less than three per cent today.
Combating poverty and illiteracy are also high priorities for Abul-Fotouh. "I pledge to end the illiteracy of all those under the age of 40 within one presidential term," he says. If elected, his vice president will be under the age of 45, presumably in a bid to attract younger voters, and 50 per cent of top jobs would go to members of the younger generation to help rejuvenate the system.

Putting the police in their place and taking the military out of politics are also key elements in Abul-Fotouh's programme. In line with his Islamist principles, he has also underlined his commitment to refer all new laws to the Islamic Sharia, in order to ensure that they conform to it.

SUPPORT: Both those who support and those who oppose Abul-Fotouh know that he is a candidate who should be taken seriously. "This man is a good man. I don't care if he comes from the Muslim Brotherhood. What I care about is what he has to offer for the future," said Darine, a postgraduate student at Ain Shams University in Cairo.

Darine, who says that she took part in the 25 January Revolution from the first day onwards, would rather see Mohamed El-Baradei, former director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) who returned to Egypt in 2010 with a clear call for political change, as president.

However, after El-Baradei's decision to quit the presidential race, Darine made up her mind to support Abul-Fotouh instead. "He is not less than El-Baradei anyway," she comments. "In some ways, he is better."
For this 23-year-old woman, Abul-Fotouh's "long years of opposition to Mubarak" put him in a higher place than El-Baradei. "He was always a critic of the former regime, when this kind of criticism came at a high price. He was jailed and subjected to many forms of persecution, but he never gave up. It is quite impressive," Darine said.
His long history of political activism is only one reason that Abul-Fotouh supporters mention when they talk about him. Other reasons offered for their support include his "ability to work with people from different political backgrounds" and his "moderate Islamist views".

"I was hesitant about whom to vote for, because I honestly did not want to vote for an Islamist. However, I must say that when I heard Abul-Fotouh speaking I thought he was a very reasonable man," said Lamia, a banker in her late 30s.

For Lamia, it is certainly comforting that Abul-Fotouh is not too engrossed in "matters related to appearance, such as the Islamic head veil" that some Muslim clerics describe as being mandatory for Muslim women.
"I don't want a president who will make women wear the veil. I want a president who worries more about acute problems, such as security, poverty, traffic, education and so on," she said.

However, to those who oppose or fear Abdel-Moneim Abul-Fotouh, the candidate's moderate Islamist views are not what they seem. "He is pretending to be moderate, but actually he was responsible for making the Muslim Brotherhood what it is today. He has the views and values of this radical Islamist organisation, and he has never said that he has changed his mind about it," said Seif, an interior designer in his early 40s.

Seif is one of those who perceive Abul-Fotouh as being the "hidden candidate of the Muslim Brotherhood" in the presidential elections, and he goes so far as to suggest that the Brotherhood's nomination of its vice supreme guide Khairat El-Shater for president and the subsequent nomination of the head of the Freedom and Justice Party, the political arm of the Brotherhood, Mohamed Mursi, was only "an act to help deceive".

Seif argues that the ascent of an Islamist to power in Egypt would be a recipe for disaster. "Having an Islamist as president, in addition to an Islamist parliament and future Islamist government, would mean that one political line controlled the country. This is called political monopoly," he said.

For Hoda, a housewife, it does not matter very much what Abul-Fotouh's past with the Brotherhood means. For her, what matters is that he is an Islamist "and that means that if he were elected our society would be changed forever."

"He might be a good man in himself who has some good ideas, but the fact of the matter is that he is an Islamist," and therefore he would change the country in what for her are unwanted ways. Speaking after many of the Salafi factions announced their support for Abdel-Moneim Abul-Fotouh, Hoda said that a man who came into office thanks to the votes of the Salafis and the Muslim Brotherhood would make sure that he favours them in order to get re-elected.

The only way in which he could do this would be to undermine some of the civil elements of Egyptian state and society and "forcibly Islamise" them, she said.

Egypt imposes curfew, deploys army after protests




Egypt's military rulers on Saturday imposed an overnight curfew and deployed soldiers around the Defence Ministry to deter a repeat of Friday's deadly violence, less than three weeks before a presidential vote.
One soldier died and almost 400 people were wounded in Friday's clashes, the second time in a week that protests over the army's handling of Egypt's troubled transition from army rule to civilian government have turned violent.
The military imposed a 11 p.m. to 7 a.m. curfew (2100 GMT to 0500 GMT) in the Abbasiya district around the defence ministry for the second straight day, according to a military source.
The streets were calm on Saturday as cleaners swept up rocks and other projectiles hurled by protestors during the previous night's violence. Troops responded with fired teargas and charged the crowd to drive them from the ministry.
Eleven people were killed in disturbances on Wednesday.
The New York-based Committee to Protect Journalists said at least 18 journalists had been assaulted, injured or arrested while covering the clashes.
"We call on the ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces to identify the attackers and bring them to justice immediately, as well as to release journalists in custody," Mohamed Abdel Dayem, CPJ's Middle East and North Africa programme coordinator, said in a statement issued late on Friday.
A presidential election, which starts on May 23-24, will choose a replacement for Hosni Mubarak, who was toppled in February last year. Generals have governed since then but their rule has been punctuated by violence and political bickering.
Many protesters who gathered near the ministry were ultra-orthodox Salafi Muslims furious that a sheikh they backed for president was disqualified from the race. Liberals and others were also there, accusing the army of seeking to manipulate or delay the vote.
The military has dismissed those allegations, insisting it will stick to its timetable of handing over power to a new president by July 1, or even earlier in the unlikely event of an outright winner in the first round of voting this month.
"Our mission ends with a successful handover of power, and we will not let anyone change the declared schedule," an army source told the website of the state-owned Al-Ahram daily.

RISING FRUSTRATION
The authorities detained 300 people, according to a military source who said they would be held for 15 days pending investigations into Friday's events.
The army had warned protesters on Thursday during a news conference that it would not tolerate threats to any of its installations. The funeral for the soldier killed took place on Saturday.
Troop carriers and soldiers formed cordons protecting the area around the ministry and deployed at nearby installations belonging to the army, which for the first time in six decades faces the prospect of a president who has not been plucked from its senior ranks.
Mubarak, like his predecessors since the king was toppled in 1952, had been a top military officer before becoming president.
Many of the protesters have called for the army to step aside sooner than planned. Scenes of troops beating protesters with sticks in anti-army demonstrations in recent months have angered many Egyptians, who expect the generals to wield their influence from behind the scenes even after a formal handover.
But many other Egyptians are equally frustrated at the protesters, accusing them of stirring up trouble on the streets and helping drive the economy to the brink of a balance of payments crisis. The nation's foreign reserves have plunged.
"The army is our leader in this period and they said a million times that they don't want to stay in power. We have elections in a few days, so I don't understand what all yesterday's fuss and violence was all about," said Essam Mohamed, 51, a government office worker in the Abbasiya area.
The presidential race broadly pits Islamists against more liberal candidates who at one time or another served in Mubarak's administration.
The two frontrunners are Abdel Moneim Abol Fotouh, an Islamist who has won the backing of a broad range of voters ranging from liberals to hardline Salafi Islamists, and Amr Moussa, the former head of the Arab League and one-time foreign minister. The Muslim Brotherhood is also fielding a candidate.
In a statement issued on Saturday, the Brotherhood condemned the violence and blamed the ruling military council for it. (Additional reporting by Ahmed Tolba and Marwa Awad, Editing by Jon Boyle)
This content is from :Reuters  

programmes presidential candidates Amr Moussa




programmes of presidential candidates Amr Moussa  


Amr Moussa, a diplomat who tries very hard to win over all sides, a former foreign minister who enjoyed unprecedented admiration, a former Arab League secretary-general who predicted that the Jasmine Revolution was only the first step towards the inevitable Arab Spring, and a politician who knows how to manoeuvre, rally and win. With a 41 per cent approval rating, Amr Moussa topped the list of 13 candidates in this week's poll conducted by Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies. He enjoys a level of name recognition among the public that few, if any, of his opponents can match.



Throughout the best part of his years in public service Amr Moussa commanded the allegiance of public opinion. He was for many years, and is still for some, seen as the charismatic politician, someone who dared to differ with his boss, president Mubarak, on matters of national security, especially relations with Israel and the US. The distance Moussa managed to publicly maintain from Mubarak and his immediate circle won him sympathy during his decade-long tenure as Egypt's foreign minister and when he was nominated for the Arab League secretary-general's job commentators lamented his departure as a loss for Egyptian diplomacy. Arab commentators then welcomed him as a man whose political positions, especially on the Arab-Israeli struggle, offered a cause for dignity.

But the thankless task of heading the Arab League, to which he was moved, many believe, because he represented a threat to plans for Gamal Mubarak to succeed his father, eroded Amr Moussa's popularity. Inevitably, he became associated with the failures of the collective Arab regime over which he presided.

Moussa's attempts to avoid the escalation of a campaign to discredit potential alternatives to Gamal Mubarak, say his aides, further complicates his position. Statements that they say were made as a matter of courtesy to the Egyptian president are now taken against him by revolutionary forces who see them as evidence of his deep links with the ousted regime, while his criticisms of the regime's foreign and domestic policies are all but ignored.
Despite a careful show of sympathy with the 25 January Revolution, Amr Moussa did not actually join the masses in calling for an end to the rule of Mubarak. He played the diplomat seeking to support the revolution indirectly. Revolutionary forces never appreciated this choice.

Today he faces a tough fight convincing his critics that his years at the helm of the Foreign Ministry were spent in serving the public rather than a regime comprised of Mubarak cronies.

As a presidential candidate, Amr Moussa is again living up to the challenge, explaining himself, arguing his case and reaching out to those who are with him and those against him with no hesitation despite the inevitable frustrations at times.

For his electoral symbol Moussa chose the sun. It brings light and warmth. It goes to people; it does not wait for people to come to it.

It may be an uphill struggle, but it is one Moussa's most implacable opponents believe he might win.
PLATFORM -- 'THE SECOND REPUBLIC': Not just a total overhaul of the system that has practically wrecked the country but a process of rejuvenation for Egypt -- this is what Moussa proposes in his platform.

Moussa launched his platform, which he says will reverse Egypt's political and economic decline, from the heart of Ezbet Al-Haggana, one of Cairo's shantytowns.

He has stressed that his platform's goals can be attained only through dedicated teamwork, orchestrated by a president planning to run for a single term. "I am calling on all citizens to join hands and work together with me to help put Egypt on the right road," said Moussa.

The programme aims at ensuring that by the end of four years Egypt is on track to eradicate poverty and illiteracy among a projected population of 150 million by 2050.

"Egypt deserves to be the strongest and leading nation not just in the Arab world but in the Middle East and the Red Sea and Mediterranean basin," says Moussa.

His priorities include improving education and healthcare and boosting scientific research. His economic policies will attempt to boost activity across sectors.

For the first 100 days Amr Moussa is particularly committed to reintroducing the much compromised security, to re-enforce the law upon all citizens alike and to end the victimisation of the marginalised segments of society and isolation of poorer neighbourhoods, governorates and border cities.

Moussa's platform also promotes equality among Egypt's citizens, placing them on an equal footing before the law, "with no discrimination, none whatsoever". A key note to his campaigning is that life must improve for every citizen, man and woman, Muslim and Copt.

SUPPORT: "We know what Moussa is capable of and we know he could do the job. And it is not just us. As a former foreign minister and secretary-general of the Arab League he is known internationally which could make his job as a president easier," says Nadia, a Copt from Tanta. "Nor is he sectarian; he does not hate us [Copts]."
"Given that the majority in this country is Muslim the president has to be Muslim, this I accept. But I cannot accept an Islamist as president," argued the middle-aged housewife. She added that she wants her grandchildren to grow up in a society where being a Copt is not something that works against you.

Other supporters say they will vote for Amr Moussa because he is a statesman capable of handling the many challenges facing Egypt both at home and abroad.

"The situation facing Egypt is far too complicated to have a pair of new hands in the top seat," says Hadi, a dermatologist in his late 20s. "This is an emergency situation that requires experience. There is no room for trial and error when you have a declining economy, retreating levels of security, deteriorating public services and the erosion of social cohesion, not just between Muslims and Copts but between the poor and the rich."

Moussa's opponents argue that experience does not count for everything, and certainly not when it has gained in the corrupting milieu of the Mubarak regime. What Egypt needs now, they say, is not someone who is going to tweak the system but who will dispense with existing formulas and start afresh.

"Moussa was never a part of the revolution and should not be allowed to take advantage of it now. Only those who were there when people risked their lives should be allowed to run for president," says Nabil, a translator in his late 40s. "I admit I was dismayed when Mubarak removed him from the Foreign Ministry to clear the way for Gamal but that was over 10 years ago. It was before the revolution."

Nabil, who says he was in Tahrir Square for every one of the 18 days of the revolution, now sees the world through the strict lens of those who were in Tahrir and those who were not.

The fact that Amr Moussa served for 10 years under Mubarak as foreign minister is something many of Moussa's opponents say militates against his election.

"I cannot reconcile myself with anyone from the old regime. It makes no difference whether or not he was removed by Mubarak to pave the way for his son. In the end Moussa served as part of the regime that the revolution came to remove," says Mona, an architect in her early 50s. Although she was not part of the revolution Mona believes it would be "unfair" for the next president to come from the old regime.

"I know people say he has experience and that he disagreed with Mubarak but I think that it is time for a fresh start. Amr Moussa is not a fresh start."

References